

Message Text

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ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY AF:WBEDMONDSON:EW

APPROVED BY AF:WESCHAUFEELE

S/S:APSHANKLE

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O 090045Z DEC 76 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 299106 TOSEC 320087

NODIS

CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, RH, UK

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MEMORANDUM: YOUR DECEMBER 11 MEETING
WITH BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND (

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SCHAUFEELE

1. YOU ARE MEETING FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND AND
RHODESIAN CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN IVOR RICHARD IN LONDON AT
4:30 P.M., FRIDAY, DECEMBER 11. ASSISTANT SECRETARY
REINHARDT AND FRANK WISNER WILL BE PRESENT TO ACCOMPANY
YOU.

2. CHECKLIST.

A. STATE OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. ASK FOR BRITISH
ASSESSMENT OF HOW NEGOTIATIONS STAND.

B. ATTITUDE OF FRONT LINE STATES: MENTION RECENT MESSAGES
YOU SENT KAUNDA, NYERERE, KHAMA, AND MACHEL AND OUR CON-
CERN OVER THEIR SHIFT AWAY FROM PRINCIPLES ORIGINALLY
DISCUSSED WITH THEM.

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C. IAN SMITH'S STATE OF MIND: DISCUSS SMITH'S INTENTIONS
AND WHETHER RHODESIANS ARE PLANNING ON FAILURE IN GENEVA.

D. BRITISH ROLE: ASK FOR BRITISH THINKING ABOUT TRANSI-

TIONAL ROLE; WHETHER THEY ARE TRYING TO REFORMULATE
ANNEX C.

E. SOUTH AFRICA'S ROLE: DISCUSS NEED TO KEEP SOUTH
AFRICA ABOARD TO INFLUENCE SMITH.

F. OPTIONS FOR FURTHER ACTION: DISCUSS PROS AND CONS OF:
(1) KEEPING CONFERENCE GOING BUT APPLYING NEW PRESSURES
TO PARTICIPANTS; (2) RECESSING CONFERENCE AND RECONVENING
AFTER TWO OR THREE WEEKS CONSULTATIONS; (3) ADJOURNING
CONFERENCE SINE DIE FOR EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS IN AFRICA;
(4) DISMISSING CONFERENCE AND SEARCHING FOR NEW FRAMEWORK.

3. SETTING.

THE BRITISH SEE CRISIS AHEAD IN GENEVA AND WILL DISCUSS A
FULL RANGE OF IDEAS ABOUT WHAT TO DO NEXT. WHILE THE
BRITISH ARE UNITED IN THEIR OWN VIEWS, EXPERIENCE IN
GENEVA HAS CONVINCED THEM THAT, IN SPITE OF THE EARLIER
ACQUIESCENCE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES TO IDEAS INCORPORATED
IN THE FIVE POINTS, THE TWO-TIERED, BALANCED INTERIM
GOVERNMENT DESCRIBED IN ANNEX C IS NOT GOING TO BE SALEABLE
TO THE ZIMBABWE NATIONALISTS. PRESSURES FROM SOME OF THE
NATIONALISTS AND FROM OBSERVERS LIKE ZAMBIA'S MARK CHONA
HAVE ALSO BROUGHT THE BRITISH TO THE VIEW THAT SOME KIND
OF DIRECT BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE TRANSITION--SHORT
OF SENDING TROOPS OR ADMINISTRATORS--MAY BE NECESSARY. IN
GENEVA, THERE HAS BEEN GROWING NATIONALIST UNITY BEHIND TH
IDEA OF A SINGLE TIER TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, PROVIDING
A NEARLY NEGLIGIBLE SHARE OF POWER FOR RHODESIAN WHITES.
AT THE SAME TIME, SMITH IS STANDING PAT WITH HIS
"KISSINGER CONTRACT." THE CONFERENCE THEREFORE FACES
DEADLOCK UNLESS SOME NEW FORMULA CAN BE WORKED OUT
OR NEW PRESSURES APPLIED TO ALL PARTIES. IN ALL
EVENTS, THE PROPOSED DECEMBER 20 CLOSING DATE CANNOT
POSSIBLY BE MET, AND THE BRITISH ARE PONDERING WHETHER TO
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CONTINUE THE CONFERENCE BEYOND THAT TIME, MOVE FOR A
BRIEF RECESS, OR END IT ALL AND START OVER.

4. ANALYSIS.

A. ONCE STARTED, THE GENEVA CONFERENCE RAPIDLY ACQUIRED
ITS OWN DYNAMIC. THE TIME LOST IN DEBATING ABOUT AN
INDEPENDENCE DATE AND THE FRONT LINE STATES' ADVOCACY OF
TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS DIFFERENT THAN THOSE DISCUSSED
WITH THEM PRIOR TO SMITH'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 24,
WAS COSTLY. NOW, HOWEVER, THE CENTRAL FACT, CONFIRMED BY
OUR CONSULTATIONS AS WELL AS BY THE BRITISH, IS THAT A
PROPOSAL ALONG THE LINES OF ANNEX C WILL ALMOST
CERTAINLY BE REJECTED BY THE NATIONALISTS. AMONG OTHER

THINGS, THE NATIONALISTS' DISTRUST OF SMITH (WHICH RHODESIAN STATEMENTS ABOUT THE TRANSITION HAVE SCARCELY MODULATED) OUTWEIGHS THEIR APPETITE FOR EARLY POWER AND MAKES THEM MUCH MORE INSISTENT UPON SOME DIFFERENT FORM OF TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT THAN THAT WHICH HE PROPOSED, ONE WHICH THEY CAN BE CERTAIN HE CANNOT MANIPULATE AND IN WHICH THEY ARE CLEARLY PREDOMINANT. IN ADDITION, NKOMO, WHO FEARS THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PROPOSED COUNCIL OF STATE, HAS TOLD REINHARDT THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN WHICH SMITH COULD INFLUENCE THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE CONSTITUTION. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ROOM FOR MANEUVER ON THIS POINT IS SEVERELY LIMITED.

B. BRITISH THINKING ABOUT RHODESIA IS DIVIDED. IVOR RICHARD, MOST FCO OFFICIALS, AND SOME CABINET MEMBERS, ARE NOW INCLINED TO ADVOCATE GREATER BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT (SHORT OF PROVIDING TROOPS OR ADMINISTRATORS) LARGELY BECAUSE THIS SEEMS TO BE THE ONLY SUBSTITUTE THE AFRICANS ARE LIKELY TO ACCEPT FOR AN IMPORTANT WHITE RHODESIAN ROLE IN THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN IS OBVIOUSLY RESERVING HIS POSITION UNTIL HE HAS A BETTER MEASURE OF PARLIAMENT'S MOOD. THE ZIMBABWE NATIONALISTS ARE ALSO DIVIDED ON THE QUESTION; SOME PREFER NOTHING MORE THAN A SYMBOLIC ROLE FOR THE BRITISH WHILE OTHERS FEEL THE BRITISH SHOULD REASSUME POWER TO HAND IT OVER TO THE AFRICAN MAJORITY. ZAMBIA'S
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INFLUENTIAL MARK CHONA, HOWEVER, APPARENTLY SEES NO PROBLEM IN GETTING AFRICAN ACCEPTANCE OF A BRITISH ROLE AND ADVOCATES THIS AS THE BEST WAY OF PROTECTING WHITE INTERESTS IN A MAJORITY-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT.

C. REALIZING THAT ANNEX C IS UNLIKELY TO BE ACCEPTED AND THAT AGREEMENT IS IMPOSSIBLE BY DECEMBER 20 IN ANY EVENT, THE BRITISH ARE UNCERTAIN WHAT TO DO NEXT. RICHARD APPARENTLY FAVORS A RECESS OR TEMPORARY ADJOURNMENT TO BE UTILIZED FOR CONSULTATIONS IN SEARCH OF A CONSENSUS ON TRANSITION PROPOSALS. FCO UNDER SECRETARY ANTHONY DUFF SEEMS INCLINED TO ADVOCATE ADJOURNING SINE DIE OR TERMINATING THE CONFERENCE COMPLETELY IN ORDER TO SEEK AN ENTIRELY NEW FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS, POSSIBLY EXCLUDING SMITH.

D. THE BRITISH SEE THEMSELVES AS STRIVING FOR CONSENSUS AMONG THE AFRICANS AND THE US AS BETTER ABLE TO INFLUENCE SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA. WHILE UNDERSTANDABLE, AND POSSIBLY ACCEPTABLE IF IT WOULD WORK, THIS STANCE DOES NOT FACILITATE RHODESIAN ACCEPTANCE OF A GREATER BRITISH ROLE.

5. ISSUES/TALKING POINTS

A. STATE OF THE CONFERENCE: THE BRITISH WILL PROBABLY CONTEND THAT IN LIEU OF RISKING A BREAKUP OR PERMANENT DEADLOCK THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE RECESSED RATHER THAN CARRIED ON PAST DECEMBER 20. WE AGREE THAT DEADLOCK SEEMS LIKELY AND THAT RECESS IS ONE OF THE OPTIONS THAT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED.

YOUR TALKING POINTS:

-- HOW DO YOU SEE THE CONFERENCE DEVELOPING OVER THE NEXT WEEK?

-- IS THERE ANY SIGN OF A CONSENSUS DEVELOPING THAT COULD BE NEGOTIATED IN THE DIRECTION OF ANNEX C?

-- ARE ALL OR MOST OF THE DELEGATES SUFFICIENTLY COM-
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MITTED TO AVOID A BREAK-UP, TO CONTINUE ON IN GENEVA, OR TO RETURN AFTER A RECESS?

-- WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF NOT BEING ABLE TO MEET THE DECEMBER 20 TERMINATION DATE?

-- WE ARE NOT OPPOSED TO A RECESS BUT FEEL THAT IT MUST BE EXAMINED WITH ALL THE ALTERNATIVES.

B. ATTITUDE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES: THE BRITISH AGREED TO BUT DID NOT EMULATE OUR ACTION IN SENDING MESSAGES URGING THE FRONTLINE PRESIDENTS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE IN FAVOR OF GREATER REALISM AND WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE ON THE PART OF THE NATIONALISTS. THE BRITISH THOUGHT YOUR MESSAGES USEFUL BUT DECIDED NOT TO SEND ANY OF THEIR OWN UNTIL THEY HAD GIVEN MORE THOUGHT TO WHAT SHOULD BE DONE NEXT. WE THOUGHT TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE IF THE ACTION WAS TO HAVE ANY USEFUL EFFECT.

YOUR TALKING POINTS:

-- I AM NOT SURE YET WHETHER MY LETTERS TO KAUNDA, NYERERE MACHEL, AND KHAMA HAD THE DESIRED EFFECT, BUT I REMINDED THEM THAT THEY HAD NOT OBJECTED TO THE SETTLEMENT APPROACH DISCUSSED WITH THEM BEFORE SMITH'S SEPTEMBER 24 STATEMENT.

-- KAUNDA TOLD CHONA THAT HE RECEIVED A "GRAVE LETTER" FROM ME AND PETER KASSANDA TOLD OUR AMBASSADOR IN LUSAKA OF HIS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE LETTER.

-- HAVE YOU HEARD ANY REACTIONS TO MY MESSAGES, EITHER IN GENEVA OR ELSEWHERE?

-- HOW DO YOU THINK WE CAN ENLIST THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS' SUPPORT FOR GREATER REALISM?

-- ARE YOU CONTEMPLATING ANY COMMUNICATIONS TO THEM?

C. IAN SMITH'S STATE OF MIND: SMITH HAS RETURNED TO GENEVA, WHERE HE HAS ALREADY TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE TO ADJOURN IF IT BROKE THE FIVE POINT "AGREEMENT" HE SAYS HE MADE WITH YOU. ALTHOUGH HE MAY SAY SECRET

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MORE AT THE CONFERENCE ON DECEMBER 9 OR 10, YOU AND CROSLAND WILL WANT TO ASK IVOR RICHARD AND FRANK WISNER FOR THEIR ASSESSMENT OF SMITH'S PERSONAL ATTITUDE AND INTENTIONS.

YOUR TALKING POINTS:

-- WHY DID SMITH RETURN AT THIS TIME?

-- WHAT IS HIS PERSONAL VIEW OF THE CONFERENCE? DOES HE WANT IT TO SUCCEED, IS HE COUNTING ON FAILURE, OR WILL HE TRY TO PRECIPITATE FAILURE?

-- WHAT WILL SMITH DO IF THE CONFERENCE IS OBVIOUSLY DEADLOCKED?

-- WHAT WILL HE DO IN CASE OF A RECESS OR ADJOURNMENT?

-- THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT SMITH IS PREPARING FOR THE FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS BY TRYING TO ENTICE NATIONALISTS LIKE MUZEREWA INTO AN AGREEMENT BASED ON THE FIVE POINTS AND IMPLEMENTED UNILATERALLY WITHIN RHODESIA. THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE AWARE OF SMITH'S THINKING ABOUT SUCH AN "INTERNAL OPTION."

-- SUCH A PLAN WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY FAIL, ACCENTUATING THE DANGERS OF TRIBAL-FACTIONAL SPLITS AND OUTSIDE SUPPORT FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE, BUT IT MIGHT ATTRACT SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT IF SMITH WERE BOLD ENOUGH TO CONSTITUTE AN ESSENTIALLY BLACK GOVERNMENT THAT MIGHT BE PORTRAYED AS FULFILLING THE FIVE POINTS.

D. THE BRITISH ROLE: THE BRITISH MAY SUGGEST THE POSSIBILITY OF BRITAIN CHAIRING AN INTERIM PRIVY COUNCIL OR FILLING SOME OTHER POSITION IN ORDER TO WIN AFRICAN ACCEPTANCE OF AN INSTITUTION CAPABLE OF PROTECTING WHITE INTERESTS. THE US HAS NEITHER URGED NOR DISCOURAGED A MORE ACTIVE BRITISH ROLE, WHICH COULD BE EXTREMELY USEFUL IF IT GENERATED BOTH AFRICAN AND WHITE RHODESIAN ACCEPTANCE OF A SINGLE PLAN. HOWEVER, THE UK SHOULD NOT EXPECT, WITHOUT THE CLOSEST CONSULTATION, THAT THE US WOULD BE

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PREPARED OR ABLE TO DELIVER RHODESIA OR SOUTH AFRICA.

YOUR TALKING POINTS;

-- WHAT IS YOUR CURRENT THINKING ABOUT A DIRECT BRITISH ROLE?

-- WHETHER TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IS SOMETHING ONLY HMG CAN DECIDE BUT WE WOULD WELCOME ANY KIND OF BRITISH ROLE THAT FACILITATES A GENUINE SOLUTION.

-- THE RHODESIANS CONTINUE TO OPPOSE ANY SIGNIFICANT BRITISH ROLE, APPARENTLY IN FEAR OF AN ACCELERATED HAND-OVER TO AFRICAN DEMANDS.

-- WHAT GUARANTEES CAN BRITAIN OFFER BOTH SIDES AS TO HOW IT WOULD PLAY ITS ROLE?

-- WHAT CHANGES WOULD A BRITISH ROLE REQUIRE IN ANNEX C?

E. SOUTH AFRICA'S ROLE: PUBLIC SUPPORT IN SOUTH AFRICA FOR ENCOURAGING SMITH TOWARD MAJORITY RULE COULD DISSIPATE WITH A BREAKDOWN OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OR AN OBVIOUS SHIFT TO PROPOSALS THAT SEEMED TO INVOLVE WHAT VORSTER'S CONSERVATIVE ELECTORATE MIGHT CONSIDER A SELLOUT OF SMITH TO THE AFRICANS. THE BRITISH, SOMETIMES ALMOST AS MUCH AS THE AFRICANS, SEEM TO ASSUME THAT THE US CAN GET SOUTH AFRICA AND SMITH TO AGREE WITHOUT DIFFICULTY TO NEW AND DIFFERENT PROPOSALS EVEN THOUGH THIS IS NOT THE CASE. THE SOUTH AFRICANS MAY EVEN BE ATTRACTED BY CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SMITH'S "INTERNAL OPTION." YOU MAY WISH TO BRIEF CROSLAND ABOUT THE MEETING ROGERS AND SCHAUFELLE HAD WITH BRAND FOURIE AND AMBASSADOR BOTHA (TOSEC 320075).

YOUR TALKING POINTS:

-- THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE OBVIOUSLY NERVOUS ABOUT GENEVA AND THE FACT THAT ANNEX C IS NOT SELLING. THEY HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE LATTER AND ANTICIPATE A BREAKDOWN OF THE CONFERENCE.

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-- VORSTER CANNOT AND WILL NOT PRESSURE SMITH TO ACCEPT A PROPOSAL THAT LEAVES NO SIGNIFICANT ROLE FOR THE WHITES IN AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT OR IN THE PROCESS OF DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION.

-- IF STRONG PRESSURE IS PLACED ON SMITH TO CONCEDE TO

WHAT SOUTH AFRICANS REGARD AS UNREASONABLE AFRICAN DEMANDS, THERE IS DANGER OF A SHIFT IN SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD GREATER MORAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR RHODESIA.

-- SOUTH AFRICA IS THE MAJOR SOURCE OF PRESSURE ON SMITH; ANY PROPOSAL THAT ATTRACTS SMITH WILL PROBABLY SUIT SOUTH AFRICA, BUT ANY PROPOSAL THAT IS NOT REASONABLE TO SOUTH AFRICA CANNOT BE FORCED ON SMITH.

F. OPTIONS FOR FURTHER ACTION: THE BRITISH ARE MOST LIKELY TO ADVOCATE RECESS OF SOME KIND, DURING WHICH THEY WOULD UNDERTAKE CONSULTATIONS TO PRODUCE A SUBSTITUTE TO ANNEX C, POSSIBLY SOMETHING BETWEEN CHONA'S SINGLE-TIER PROPOSAL (REPEATED SEPTTEL) AND ANNEX C, INCLUDING A BRIDGING ROLE FOR THE UK. WE HAVE TAKEN NO DECISION BUT BELIEVE IT WISE TO EXAMINE THE PROS AND CONS OF FOUR BASIC OPTIONS:

(1) KEEPING THE CONFERENCE IN SESSION. UNLESS THE CONFEREES THEMSELVES CALL FOR A RECESS (WHICH IS POSSIBLE) THE CHANCES ARE THAT STALEMATE WILL ENSUE. MOST MAY BE WILLING TO STAY IN GENEVA BUT THE DANGER OF SOME--ESPECIALLY SMITH--LOSING PATIENCE AND WALKING OUT WILL BE GREATLY INCREASED. IN THE ABSENCE OF A NEW FORMULA TO REPLACE ANNEX C AND MUCH STRONGER PRESSURE ON ALL THE PARTICIPANTS, FAILURE IS LIKELY.

(2) RECESSING FOR TWO OR THREE WEEKS. ALTHOUGH THE CONFERENCE MAY BE LIKE HUMPTY DUMPTY, A BRIEF RECESS SEEMS POSSIBLE, ESPECIALLY IF IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT CONSULTATIONS WILL BE UNDERTAKEN TO FORMULATE NEW PROPOSALS FOR CONSIDERATION WHEN IT RECONVENES. THIS MAY BE THE BEST WAY OF CIRCUMVENTING A BLOWUP, BUT MAY ONLY POSTPONE FAILURE UNLESS NEW PROPOSALS ARE INDEED DEVELOPED. A RECESS COULD
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BE PROLONGED IF NECESSARY.

(3) ADJOURNMENT SINE DIE. ALTHOUGH ADJOURNING FOR "EXTENSIVE" CONSULTATIONS WOULD PERMIT A MORE RELAXED APPROACH, IT INCREASES THE HUMPTY DUMPTY FACTOR AND OFFERS LITTLE THAT CANNOT BE DONE BY PROLONGING A RECESS.

(4) TERMINATING THE CONFERENCE AND STARTING OVER. THIS WOULD ADMIT TO FAILURE OF THE PRESENT PROCESS. IT RUNS THE RISK OF SMITH TAKING IRREVERSIBLE UNILATERAL ACTION, ALMOST CERTAINLY CLOSING OUT OTHER OPTIONS FOR REACHING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS PREDICATED ON FINDING SOMETHING MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE NATIONALISTS, IT WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE HARDER TO WIN SMITH'S COOPERATION AND SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT, LEAVING LESS CHANCE OF SUCCESS THAN THE PRESENT PROCESS.

YOUR TALKING POINTS

-- WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE PROS AND CONS OF THE VARIOUS
OPTIONS OPEN TO US?

-- ON BALANCE, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SIGNS THAT A BREAK-
THROUGH IS POSSIBLE, WE WOULD BE INCLINED TO TEST DELE-
GATES VIEWS ABOUT A RECESS OF TWO TO THREE WEEKS AND
CHOOSE THAT OPTION IF THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT, USING
THE TIME SUCH A RECESS AFFORDS TO DISCUSS ALTERNATIVE
SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS WITH ALL PARTIES.

-- WE BELIEVE A DEFINITE DATE SHOULD BE SET FOR RECONVEN-
ING. WE WOULD NOT MENTION THE POSSIBILITY OF POSTPONE-
MENT, BUT BELIEVE SUCH POSSIBILITY SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN
SUBJECT TO FURTHER US-UK CONSULTATIONS.

ROBINSON

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 16 SEP 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TOSEC, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, BRIEFING MATERIALS, FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS, NEGOTIATIONS, CAT-B, CHEROKEE 12/09/76
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 DEC 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: saccheem
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976STATE299106
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: AF:WBEDMONDSON:EW
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 XGDS-3
Errors: n/a
Film Number: P840104-1899
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19761293/baaaeqxm.tel
Line Count: 399
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: saccheem
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 14 MAY 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <14 MAY 2004 by woolflhd>; APPROVED <07 SEP 2004 by saccheem>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BRIEFING MEMORANDUM: YOUR DECEMBER 11 MEETING
TAGS: PFOR, PDEV, UK, RH, US, (KISSINGER, HENRY A), (CROSLAND, ANTHONY), (RICHARD, IVOR)
To: SECRETARY
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006